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Abstract 
This paper aims to determine the importance of the The structure of Sukuk 
through the creation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) provides better transparency 
thereby reducing corruption and wastage as productive assets must be put to work in 
order to generate rental incomes for investors, rather than disappearing into off shore 
banking centres or participating in deliberately over priced projects. 
The paper relies on The 2014 report makes interesting reading with Denmark, 
New Zealand and Finland ranked as the least corrupt countries and unfortunately a 
host of OIC countries coming out towards the wrong side of index, with the notable 
exception of the UAE and Qatar which rank 25 and 26 respectively, better than the likes 
of France, Portugal and Poland. 
The results show that Corruption and abuse of state funds affects many 
countries and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries are no exception. 
Corruption has a devastating impact for many reasons, one of which is whilst funds are 
siphoned off abroad, the debt remains on the countries balance sheet and accrues 
interest charges, compounding larger year after year. 
The results In addition to the traditional benefits of sukuk, such as diversifying 
an investor base and accessing investors who do not invest in interest based bonds, a 
less discussed value add of sukuk is its structure, particularly the Ijara structure which 
to a greater deal over conventional bonds prevents the wastage of funds through 
corruption and theft. 
This paper is a pioneer study undertaking about Sukuk Reduces Risk of 
Corruption and Theft of Funds 
Keywords: Sukuk, Risk, Corruption, Islam, Economics and Funds 
 
Introduction 
The Government of Indonesia conducted a regular sukuk auction last week and 
absorbed IDR1.98 trillion from incoming bid amounting IDR3.25 trillion, 
slightly lower than indicative target of IDR2 trillion. Average weighted 
yields were 18 bps higher for 6-months T-bills but 4 bps lower for PBS07 
(maturing in 2040) respectively than prior auction result dated on 10 
March. Government also issued IDR2.7 trillion PBS06 by private 
placement to Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation. At this moment, 
the government has issued a total of IDR170.16 trillion year-to-date out 
of annual gross target of IDR452 trillion (budget revision). 
Ras Al Khaimah Sukuk 
This is Ras Al Khaimah’s first sukuk issuance since October 2013, when the 
UAE emirate of Ras Al Khaimah sukuk was priced at 3.297% (MS+175bps) with a total 
of USD500m which garnered orders over USD5bn, which represents much stronger 




Also launching this week was the Emirates airlines sukukwhich is to fund the 
orders for A380-800, as Emirates seeks USD107.5bn worth of aircrafts from Boeing 
and Airbus. This is the first time for UK Export Finance (UKEF) to guarantee a sukuk. 
This weeks Germanwings crash as well as subdued demand, intense competition 
(from low cost carriers), and overcapacity issues may dampening market’s sentiment for 
the airline sector. 
(Reproduced with permission from RHB Global Sukuk Markets Research, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia) 
In a research note, RHB Research reported the Bloomberg Sukuk Market Return 
Index (BMSSUTR) rose marginally 0.07% W-o-W (vs. +0.13% in week prior) to 
119.71, bringing YTD return to 1.23% (vs. 1.23% in week prior). The Dow Jones 
Sukuk Total Return Index (DJSUKTXR) rose 0.06% W-o-W (vs. +0.24% in week 
prior) to 154.87, with YTD returns to 1.56% (vs. 1.50% in week prior). 
The expanding Yemen civil war and Iran’s disputes with UN added geopolitical 
risk premiums back to oil (Brent +8.7% W-o-W to USD59.2/bbl) and the Middle East 
markets, overall reversing sukuk gains out of FOMC’s dovishness last week. Similarly, 
10y UST ended at 1.99%, returning to last week’s levels after touching 1-month lows of 
1.87% on Tuesday. The top 5 gainers in the BMSSUTR during the week were QATAR 
23, SECO 22, ISDB 19, SECO 24 and SECO 23 adding market value by USD3.1bn. 
 
Sukuk primary market should be supported as UAE forms federal Shariah Board 
by 3Q15, where the board will assess standards of Islamic financial products; whether it 
conforms with Islamic creeds. As a comparison, Malaysia established its board in 1997, 
therefore we think the Sharia Board formation is overdue, but is a positive step towards 
building confidence in sukuk products and should support sukuk issuance toward end of 
2H15. Nevertheless, it still depends on the US Fed rate hike decision. Risks loom in the 
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region, where Saudi Arabia led air strikes in Yemen and pressured oil prices by c. 9% 
W-o-W (week prior -5%) to USD59/bbl. 
(Source: RHB Global Sukuk Markets Research, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 
Moody’s affirms Pakistan US dollar Trust Certificates issued by The Second 
Pakistan International Sukuk Company Limited with Caa1 rating, whilst revising the 
outlook on Pakistan’s foreign currency government bond rating to positive from stable. 
 
A stronger external liquidity position 
Net foreign reserves with the State Bank of Pakistan climbed to $11.2 billion as 
of 13 March 2015, from $3.2 billion at the end of January 2014. The cushion provided 
by foreign reserves coupled with dwindling external debt repayments to the IMF has 
reduced external vulnerabilities. This has in large part resulted from a lower current 
account deficit, which was easily financed by the issuance of a Eurobond in April 2014, 
a Sukuk issuance in December, continued disbursements under the IMF program, and 
privatization proceeds. 
 
Efforts towards fiscal consolidation 
The government has relied on the banking system for deficit financing, but such 
borrowing is gradually declining as privatization proceeds, and the Eurobond and Sukuk 
issuances, have helped it to diversify funding. Moreover, the maturity of domestic 
public debt is lengthening as the government substitutes shorter-term treasury bills with 
Pakistan Investment Bonds that carry a longer tenure. This will reduce roll-over risks 
and volatility in debt issuance prices. 
In its annual report, Transparency International ranks countries based on expert 
opinions of public sector corruption. Countries scores can be helped by open 
government where the public can hold leaders to account, while a poor score is a sign of 
prevalent bribery, lack of punishment for corruption and public institutions that don’t 
respond to citizens needs. 
Taking the example of the sukuk issued by the Government of Luxembourg in 
2014, three government properties – two towers of the Gate of Europe in Kirchberg and 
the Gutenberg building in Strassen were sold to a Luxembourg SPV for which the 
Luxembourg Government was the single shareholder. 
The SPV was securitised by means of the sukuk holders investing €200 million 
who whilst receiving this value back at maturity (when the Government buys back the 
properties from the SPV), would receive a benchmark linked profit rate of 0.436% to be 
generated from the rental income received by the SPV from the tenants of the three 
properties securitised. 
This asset linked profit generation means investors get to understand the 
underlying asset and are more involved in the project. All money raised has to be 
accounted for as it is used by the SPV to purchase the properties, the funds cannot go 






Transparency will Increase Investors Confidence to Fund Big Infrastructure 
Projects 
Increased transparency can be used to inspire investor confidence and trust thus 
leading to increased foreign direct investment (FDI). For countries which face the 
challenges of corruption as well as those seeking to avoid the injustices of interest based 
bond borrowing, sukuk represent an opportunity to tap a new investor base, one that is 
ethical and provides the borrower more rights and prevents abusive interest charges in 
case of default. 
At a recent Islamic finance conference in Nigeria, Usman Hassan, CEO of Jaiz 
Bank, a Nigerian based Islamic Bank set up in 2003, urged the Nigerian government to 
take a closer look at sovereign sukuk issuances to fund infrastructure projects. He stated 
―Sukuk are very apt for Nigeria, as you cannot have failed projects…for every project 
you have, you are raising government money and it has to be accounted for, the 
financier (investor) will not allow abuse‖. He urged to government to look at the 
structure of sukuk to see how it can be of benefit to the economy as a source of FDI 
from a new diverse investor base. 
 
Creating Transparency and Growth in Project and Infrastructure Finance 
Growth in project and infrastructure finance is not being held up by a lack of 
appetite from banks, explained opening speaker Michael Wilkins, Managing Director of 
Infrastructure Ratings at Standard & Poor’s Rating Services. Pointing out that global 
project finance volumes have reached their highest level since the crisis, he said: 
―Rumours of the death of project finance have been exaggerated. Lending is very 
healthy.‖ 
Unfortunately, however, there continues to be a noticeable disparity between the 
surplus liquidity that is available to invest and the lack of infrastructure projects to 
invest in. Management consultancy McKinsey has estimated this investment gap as 
being $20 trillion through to 2030 in the G20alone. While the money is out there, we 
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will only see growth in project and infrastructure finance once the shortage of projects 
being procured by governments has been addressed. 
The paper examine show Sub-Saharan African governments can reduce real and 
perceived corruption risks of transport and energy infrastructure projects. On one hand, 
there is rising interest by investors in projects co-financed by governments and 
development finance institutions (DFI). On the other hand, such complex contracting 
models increase the possibilities of concealing misconduct. Meanwhile, there is growing 
scrutiny around the world of issues relating to anti-bribery and corruptionand an 
increasing risk of prosecution or debarment even for third-party misconduct. 
Consequently, real and perceived corruption risks discourage the mutually beneficial 
match of high return projects for private investors and closing Africa’s infrastructure 
gap. 
Desk research and expert interviews with key project stakeholders helped 
identify what they perceive as major corruption risks. These were categorised 
andillustrated by case examples. The overall key finding is somewhat counterintuitive. 
Potential private investors in public-private infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa do not regard the tender process as the highest corruption risk. Rather, they are 
highly concerned about the transparency environment of the project origination (project 
appraisal, selection, design and budgeting), because misconduct at this initial phase 
gives leeway for corruption at later project stages.  
This carries an important message for DFIs and other donors, who traditionally 
focus on promoting procurement reform. Together with host governments, they should 
instead award more attention to improving governance at the project preparation phase, 
as in most Sub-Saharan African countries these are carried out either poorly, or not at 
all. By recommending to reduce information asymmetry with investors on the project 
preparation, the paper urges policy-makers to better consider the perspective of 
investors in planning infrastructure projects. 
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein are solely those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the OECD or of its member 
countries. This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the 
status ofor sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers 
and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. This paper was submitted 
as part of a competitive call for papers on integrity, anti-corruptionand inclusive growth 
in the context of the 2018 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum. The 
present paper was developed as part of a thought leadership initiative of Kroll, the 
leading global provider of risk and investigative services, and as the capstone project for 
the Master of Public Policy 2016/2017 at the Blavatnik School of Government, 
University of Oxford. 
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein are solely those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the official views of Kroll, the Blavatnik School of 
Government. The author thanks Mr. Oliver Stern and Mr. Chris Ives of Kroll for their 
support during the writing of this paper. 
The analysis relies on combining evidence from existing literature (academic 
papers, policy reports by DFIs, NGOs and companies, etc.) with real-world view points 
gathered through sixteen expert interviews. These were conducted with key 
stakeholders, such as investors, contractors, corruption and fraud investigators and 
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representatives of DFIs and civil society organisations (for an anonymous list of the 
interviewees see the Sources). The aim of the interviews was to collect valuable first-
hand observation sand there is no intention to generalise these experiences. Admittedly, 
such expert interviews are subjective and provide unsystematic information. At the 
same time, they deliver invaluable insights on sensitive matters, which arerarely 
documented or mediatised, such as the real reasonsfor project failure. 
The risk areas identified are illustrated through case examples. Such aselection 
of projects could be affected by confirmatory bias, so the issues raised are not claimed 
to be representative for all infrastructure projects. The aim of the case boxes is solely to 
highlight the existence of certain types of risks that seem to be recurrent. While some of 
the casespresent wrongdoings which were publicly prosecuted, others are hypothetical 
examples or sanitised versions of projects discussed duringthe interviews. Such caution 
was dictated by the lack of evidence, but also for the protection of the anonymity of the 
sources. More over, while the paper seeks to build on past experience, its purpose is 
entirely forward-looking: identifying risks, instead of bringing accusations. 
Corruption risk among the main obstacles One of the reasons investors are 
hesitant about capitalising on such opportunities is the high corruption risk of 
infrastructure projects. According to the OECD, half of bribes paid are in industries 
with the largest spending on infrastructure, namely the extractive (19%), construction 
(15%) and transportation (15%) sectors(OECD, 2014, 8). Among the main causes 
ofsuch a high occurrence of corruption are the complexity of the project cycle, the 
uniqueness of projects, direct control by agovernment with often poor management 
practices, and a deep-seated ―culture of secrecy‖ (Stansbury, 2005, 38). The effects of 
corruption on the project can be inappropriate project choice, high prices, poor quality, 
excessive time and cost overruns, in adequate maintenance and low returns. These 
impede the infrastructure’s contribution to economic growth and translate into 
reputational and commercial losses for the private investor. 
 
Project origination scenarios signalling corruption risk 
Most of these corrupt practices take place around the tender process. Indeed, this 
is what donor-led reforms put most pressure on.Their efforts are usually concentrated 
around improving project implementation, particularly procurement.For instance, the 
so-called Public Financial Management and New Public Management reforms promoted 
by the DFIs in the 1980s and 1990s included reforming public procurement systems and 
introduced outsourcing to private companies. However,the roots of corruption in the 
tender areoften to be found in earlier project phases. As Figure 2 shows, the project 
cycle has many stages, and corruption affects each of them. Moreover, corruption 
during the early stages of project appraisal, design and budgeting may open doors for 
wrong doings later on. The problem is that in states with weak governance system, such 
as the discussed Sub-Saharan African countries, it is exactly these phases that are either 
poorly executed or missing altogether (Wells, 2015, 5). 
The need to devote more attention to project origination is pioneered by some 
civil society activistsand was also confirmed by the expert interviews. Many 
respondents agreed that verifying how the contract was awarded by no means 
guarantees that the project was ―clean‖ [I1][I2][I7][I9][I11][I16]. Instead, it also needs 
to be checked, whether the project preparation that took place prior to the investor’s 
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involvement was in line with international best practices of transparency. More over, the 
wider project context has to be thoroughly analysed to detect threats tothe project’s 
transparency and success prospects. Desk research paired with the valuable first-hand 
experience of interviewees helped identify a series of initial project characteristics, 
which are typically indicative of corruption risks at further project stages. These are 
usually scenarios, where the project was launched in spite of its questionable feasibility 
or economic necessity (so-called ―white elephant projects‖), or where the project’s 
smooth execution is vulnerable to its high political sensitivity. In thesecases, the project 
is exposed to increased risks of delays, suspension, lack of operational capacity, etc. 
Moreover, such projects are particularly conducive to wrong doing through out the 
project cycle, because in order to mask such defects, there is a high chance that further 
bribes will be paid (e.g. to obtain positive progress reports or audits). 
 
Real vs. (mis)-percieved risks 
While there are many scenarios in which investors failed to identify early 
indicators of misconduct, an exaggerated reliance on perceptions can be atrap at the 
opposite extreme. Lack of information and/or careful analysis of the project origination 
environment and the parties involved can produce a costly misjudgement of the 
corruption-risk level of the project by either under-or overestimating it. There is a great 
deal governments and DFIs can do to help potential investors navigate perceptions and 
rightly assess corruption-related risks. 
 
Transparency Is Assurance 
The word "transparent" can be used to describe high-quality financial 
statements. The term has quickly become a part of business vocabulary. Dictionaries 
offer many definitions for the word, but those synonyms relevant to financial reporting 
are: "easily understood," "very clear," "frank" and "candid." 
Consider two companies with the same market capitalization, overall market-
risk exposure and financial leverage. Assume that both also have the same earnings, 
earnings growth rate and similar returns on capital. The difference is that Company X is 
a single-business company with easy-to-understand financial statements. Company Y, 
by contrast, has numerous businesses and subsidiaries with complex financials. 
Which one will have more value? Odds are good the market will value Company 
X more highly. Because of its complex and opaque financial statements, Company Y's 
value will be discounted. 
The reason is simple: less information means less certainty for investors. When 
financial statements are not transparent, investors can never be sure about a company's 
real fundamentals and true risk. For instance, a firm's growth prospects are related to 
how it invests. It's difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate a company's investment 
performance if its investments are funneled through holding companies, hiding from 
view. Lack of transparency may also obscure the company's debt level. If a company 
hides its debt, investors can't estimate their exposure to bankruptcy risk. 
High-profile cases of financial shenanigans, such as those at Enron and Tyco, 
showed everyone that managers employ fuzzy financials and complex business 





Mounting evidence suggests that the market gives a higher value to firms that 
are up front with investors and analysts. Transparency pays, according to Robert Eccles, 
author of "The Value Reporting Revolution" (2001). Eccles shows that companies with 
fuller disclosure win more trust from investors. Relevant and reliable information means 
less risk to investors and thus a lower cost of capital, which naturally translates into 
higher valuations. The key finding is that companies that share the key metrics and 
performance indicators that investors consider important are more valuable than those 
companies that keep information to themselves. 
Of course, there are two ways to interpret this evidence. One is that the market 
rewards more transparent companies with higher valuations because the risk of 
unpleasant surprises is believed to be lower. The other interpretation is that companies 
with good results usually release their earnings earlier. Companies that are doing well 
have nothing to hide and are eager to publicize their good performance as widely as 
possible. It is in their interest to be transparent and forth coming with information, so 
that the market can upgrade their fair value. 
Further evidence suggests that the tendency among investors to mark down 
complexity explains the conglomerate discount. Relative to single-market or pure play 
firms, conglomerates could be discounted. The positive reaction associated with spin-
offs and divestment can be viewed as evidence that the market rewards transparency. 
Naturally, there could be other reasons for the conglomerate discount. It could be the 
lack of focus of these companies and the inefficiencies that follow. Or it could be that 
the absence of market prices for the separate businesses makes it harder for investors to 
assess value. 
 
The Role of Transparency 
Transparency – in the form of risk and data analysis – will be key in enabling 
growth in the project and infrastructure market. This is because the more information 
that market participants have; the more confident they will feel about making decisions 
to invest in infrastructure. 
With this in mind, Arnold Gevero, Associate Director at S&P Capital IQ, gave 
an update on global project finance performance, based on the S&P Capital IQ Project 
Finance default and recovery study. The study, which was started by a small group of 
global banks in 2001, represents the historical compilation of performance information 
– including default rates – from the project finance portfolios of 35 lending institutions. 
Describing the study as ―one of the largest sources of aggregated global project 
finance recovery information‖, Gevero revealed that as of 2014 the study covered 7,959 
projects, of which 624 had defaulted on their debt. 
Gevero explained that over the past five years there had been steady project 
finance growth across all regions, but projects were largely concentrated in the three 
most popular sectors – power, transportation and oil and gas. He also noted that the 
number of defaults was higher in these sectors due to their dominance in the market. 
Transparency matters greatly to the $40-trillion global pension fund industry, 
revealed Jon Winslade, Vice President of EMEA Asset Owners Channel Management at 




While global pension funds in aggregate have less than 1% of their assets 
invested in infrastructure in aggregate, they are increasingly looking to infrastructure as 
a means to hedge against inflation and achieve growth. This is provided that they can 
find the right assets, however. Between 2004 and 2014, $215bn in institutional money 
was committed to infrastructure investment. Typically the investment is made into large 
funds that are around $6 bn in size on average. 
―There is a spending gap and a target investment gap, so the challenge is to put 
these together, and pensions are trying to do this whatever way they can,‖ Winslade 
said. ―They’re starting to do this through listed securities and index investing can 
provide a low cost solution to that.‖Nevertheless the lack of objective, high-quality data 
on infrastructure projects continues to be an issue. Winslade highlighted that it can be 
very hard for pension funds to find appropriate benchmarks to use when assessing 
infrastructure investment. ―It’s difficult to advocate using a listed benchmark with 
unlisted,‖ he said, ―because you are comparing apples with automobiles, but there is 
merit in thinking about such indices as a means to measure the opportunity cost of not 
investing in highly transparent, and generally cheaper, investment approaches which 
still enable access to infrastructure returns.‖ 
And the other explain about The strive for more transparency presupposes that 
destabilizing behavior by individual investors can be avoided or attenuated by improved 
provision of information. For example, international investment funds may be more 
likely to engage in herding in less transparent countries (where herding is defined as 
funds taking investment decisions which they would not take if they did not observe 
other funds taking them). As a result, investors may rush in and out of countries even in 
the absence of substantial news about fundamentals. 
As far as we know, there has been no systematic examination on the relationship 
between transparency, especially the transparency of government policies, on the 
pattern of international investment. The objective of this paper is to provide an 
evaluation of this relationship. Specifically, we will first document whether 
transparency of a country has any effect on the level of international investment. We 
will then examine whether transparency affects the herding tendency of international 
investment funds. 
Transparency could affect the level of international portfolio investment. In the 
corporate finance context, Diamond and Verrechia (1991), among others, have argued 
that a reduction in informational asymmetry can increase the investment from large 
investors and hence reduce the cost of capital for the firm (see Healy and Palepu, 2001, 
and Core, 2001, for reviews of the empirical literature on corporate disclosure). So far, 
there is no theoretical paper that has modeled explicitly the effect of a country’s 
transparency on the level of international portfolio investment. However, it seems 
reasonable to extrapolate from the corporate finance literature that an improvement in a 
country’s transparency can be expected to lead to an increase in the level of investment 
by international mutual funds. 
In terms of the effect of transparency on herding behavior, the relationship in 
theory is more complex. On the one hand, one set of theoretical explanations of herding 
behavior relies on asymmetric information (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 
1992; Devenow and Welch, 1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). We would note 
that there is a natural linkage between low transparency and asymmetry of information. 
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Low transparency typically does not mean that no one knows anything. Rather, lower 
transparency means that less information is made publicly available, which in turn 
implies that the gap between those who know and those who do not becomes larger. 
Such higher informational asymmetry should therefore result in more herding. 
On the other hand, herding by institutional investors can be rationalized without 
an appeal to informational asymmetry at all, but instead by the incentives faced by fund 
managers that result from the need to have their performances compared periodically 
with a common benchmark (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; and Chevalier and Ellison, 
1999). In this case, an improvement in a country’s transparency would not imply a 
reduction in international investors’ herding behavior. 
Related to this discussion, the theoretical link between availability of 
information and market volatility is ambiguous, as pointed out, among others, by 
Furman and Stiglitz (1998). While their argument is not specifically about herding 
behavior, it is about investors’ trading behavior in different information environments. 
In particular, they suggest that if more transparency means a higher frequency of 
information release (holding the true value of the fundamental constant), price volatility 
could increase rather than decline. The notion that transparency may not necessarily 
reduce volatility is reflected in the recent literature on corporate transparency. In 
particular, Bushee and Noe (2000) report a positive association between corporate 
transparency and the volatility of the firm’s stock price. Firms with higher levels of 
disclosure tend to attract certain types of institutional investors which use aggressive, 
short-term trading strategies which in turn can raise the volatility of the firm’s stock 
price. It is not clear whether this investor self-selection story can be generalized to 
international context. Ultimately, the effect of transparency on the behavior of 
international investors is an empirical question. 
 
Transparency Encourages Foreign Investment 
"Without exception, a country's lack of transparency is associated with lower exposure 
of emerging market funds." 
Whenever economic performance falters in emerging markets, analysts are 
frequently heard lamenting what they call a "lack of transparency." What they mean is 
that some countries-and the corporations that operate there-may contribute to their woes 
by failing to fully disclose information about financial and economic conditions while 
also being less than clear about the laws and regulations that govern their markets. For 
example, governments might be viewed as withholding information on (or being vague 
about) debt levels, fiscal policies, and regulatory requirements, while companies may be 
seen as stingy with financial disclosures. 
In Transparency and International Investment Behavior, (NBER Working Paper 
No. 9260), coauthors R. Gaston Gelos and Shang-Jin Wei find that, at least when it 
comes to attracting much needed foreign capital, a lack of transparency indeed may 
affect economic performance by repelling international investors. "There is relatively 
clear evidence," they state, "that low transparency...tends to depress the level of 
international investment." 
Gelos and Wei reach this conclusion after synthesizing data from various 
international surveys that assess government and corporate candor in addressing 
economic and financial conditions. For governments, the authors were interested in data 
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measuring the "transparency and predictability" of broad economic policies in addition 
to the "frequency and timeliness" of information releases. In seeking data on corporate 
transparency, Gelos and Wei hoped to "capture as accurately as possible the notion of 
information quality and availability." 
They then took their ratings of corporate and government transparency and 
compared them to the monthly investment decisions of up to 90 global funds that invest 
in emerging economies between 1996 and 2000. What the data show, according to 
Gelos and Wei, is that "without exception" a country's lack of transparency "is 
associated with lower exposure of emerging market funds." For example, looking at a 
sample of emerging market funds, the authors find that Venezuela accounted for about 
0.4 percent of the investment portfolio. But they state that it could "achieve an increase 
in weight in fund portfolios by 1.7 percentage points if it increased its transparency to 
Singapore's level." In other words, the international portfolio investment to Venezuela 
would have increased by 300 percent. 
They also find a "moderate amount of evidence" that lack of transparency makes 
investors more likely to engage in herding behavior; that is, when dealing with less 
transparent countries, investment decisions are more likely to be determined by what 
other fund managers are doing as opposed to a rational, independent assessment of 
market fundamentals. This lemming-like activity, in which investors suddenly take their 
money and run en masse, often is cited as contributing to economic instability by 
exacerbating crises in emerging markets. Indeed, Gelos and Wei find that during 
economic crises, fund managers "flee non-transparent countries and invest in more 
transparent ones."  
Finally, Gelos and Wei observe that a lack of transparency seems to make 
investors somewhat suspicious of economic news. While investors elsewhere routinely 
react to economic news by immediately reconfiguring their portfolios, in less 
transparent economies, the authors find, "fund managers may want to wait for further 
confirmation before engaging in a costly reallocation of assets." 
 
Transparency Matters 
The more forthcoming countries are, the more they 
can resist the ups and downs of global financial 
conditions 
Over the past 20 years, emerging market economies 
have become increasingly integrated into world 
financial markets. For example, U.S. portfolio 
holdings of long-term securities (equities and long-
term bonds) issued by entities from 27 key emerging market economies roughly tripled 
as a share of each country’s GDP between 1994 and 2012 (see Table 1). 
163 
 
This increase in financial integration has 
brought emerging market economies 
tremendous benefits. It has reduced their 
cost of capital (which has expanded 
investment opportunities), improved risk 
sharing and portfolio diversification, sped 
up the transfer of technology, and 
contributed to the spread of best practices 
in investor protection and governance. 
But deepening financial integration has 
come at a price for many of these 
economies: it has increased their 
vulnerability to the ups and downs of 
international financial markets. However, 
that increased vulnerability varies 
significantly—it is higher for some 
countries, lower for others. To devise 
policies to reduce the volatility that can 
accompany increased global integration, 
governments must understand how 
country characteristics shape the way 
global financial markets affect emerging 
market economies. 
To that end, we examined the role 
that country transparency plays in the 
amplification of financial shocks 
emanating from global financial centers. 
We found that the more transparent 
economies—those that provide more data 
and in a more timely fashion and have 
better corporate disclosure standards, 
more predictable policies, and better 
governance-react less sharply to both improvements and deteriorations in global market 
conditions than do the more opaque emerging market economies that score worse on 
various dimensions of transparency. 
 
Country transparency and capital flows 
Many individual country factors influence the speed and intensity with which 
financial shocks propagate across economies. Financial linkages, such as common 
exposures by banks and mutual funds, play an important role in the transmission of 
common shocks and in financial contagion. It is also known that financial integration, 
the result of lower barriers to cross-border financial flows, generally facilitates the 
international propagation of financial shocks (Bekaert and others, 2011). 
Less clear, however, is the role played by country-level transparency—that is, 
the availability of information that allows investors to properly assess risks and returns 
associated with investing in a country. It is often asserted that more transparency can be 
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beneficial both in attracting investment and in helping to avoid excessive volatility of 
capital flows. The argument is that more transparency enhances the orderly and efficient 
functioning of financial markets. Transparency reduces the occurrence of such 
phenomena as herding (where investors make certain decisions merely because they 
observe others making them), waves of investment flows driven by sentiment, and 
investor overreaction to news. The global financial crisis has drawn renewed attention 
to the role opacity plays in exacerbating financial shocks. 
However, in principle, more transparency can actually result in higher volatility 
and, as a result, be destabilizing. For example, transparency might generate excessive 
provision of public information (through disclosures from governments or market 
participants), which could crowd out potentially more precise private information—
reducing information efficiency and increasing volatility—especially when such 
information is confusing (―noisy,‖ in financial parlance) or unrelated to fundamental 
conditions. For example, the timely publication of preliminary (and imprecise) official 
data may lead market participants to overreact to such news, causing too much price 
volatility in financial markets (Morris and Shin, 2002). More transparency also 
contributes to financial integration (by reducing information costs and asymmetries) and 
can augment the simultaneous movement of prices across markets (Carrieri, Chaieb, and 
Errunza, 2013). 
Although there is some evidence that supports the beneficial effects of country-
level transparency (Gelos and Wei, 2005), the overall evidence is ambiguous. 
Moreover, existing empirical studies have focused largely on the transmission of 
financial shocks during crisis 
episodes. 
We explored whether opacity at 
the country level amplifies the 
local impact of global market 
conditions over the business cycle 
by examining the behavior of 
bond and equity prices. The basic 
hypothesis is that when global 
financial conditions are benign, 
international investors become 
more prone to invest in markets 
whose underlying distribution of 
risks they understand less well 
(―ambiguous‖ markets) and then 
flee when global conditions 
deteriorate. Investors could 
behave this way for several 
reasons. They might become 
more comfortable with ambiguity when their other investments have performed well. 
Another possibility is that during difficult times fund managers face more scrutiny and 
more pressure to justify the asset composition of their portfolios and respond by 
reducing their exposure to assets whose risks are less well understood. Consequently, 
they are more prone to hold less transparent assets during good times than during bad 
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times. Alternatively, ambiguity may make it harder for investors to separate 
fundamental shocks from pure noise shocks, inducing them to associate benign signals 
in the financial centers with good fundamentals in the ambiguous markets. 
Whatever the reason (and the possibilities are not mutually exclusive), more opaque 
markets experience larger booms when financial market conditions are favorable, 
whereas the opposite is true during bad times (see chart). 
Gauging transparency 
Measuring country transparency poses significant difficulties. First, we need 
measures that capture some notion of the inability to pin down precisely how likely 
different events are. We are therefore interested in indices of opacity that gauge the 
availability of all relevant information the investor can use to assess the risks associated 
with investing in a given country. Second, we need indices that cover many countries 
and go back a long time. Therefore, we focused on indices measuring corruption, 
governance, corporate disclosure practices, accounting standards, and the transparency 
of government policies and statistics. 
To quantify the impact of global financial shocks on asset prices from emerging 
markets, we used, as a proxy for liquidity conditions and risk aversion in financial 
centers, the VIX, which measures investor expectations of stock market volatility over 
the next 30 days. In doing so, we controlled for several different measures of country 
opacity (ranging from the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency of 
government policies to broader measures of opacity, such as perceptions of corruption). 
Using data for both stock and bond markets over the period 1997–2011, we consistently 
found that emerging markets that score worse on various dimensions of opacity 
measures react more strongly to global market conditions than economies that are more 
transparent. 
It is significant that this result 
holds even when we controlled 
for a broad range of measures of 
risk, credit quality, and liquidity 
(Brandão-Marques, Gelos, and 
Melgar, 2013). In fact, according 
to our estimates, in response to a 
10 percent increase in the VIX 
(considered a mildly negative 
shock), the countries with the 
most transparent government 
policies would experience an 
increase in sovereign bond 
spreads (the difference between 
the rate a country pays to borrow 
and the rate on U.S. Treasury 
securities) roughly 0.4 percentage point lower than that of the median country. By 
contrast, the least transparent country would have an increase in those spreads of 0.3 
percentage point more than the median country. The ―transparency gains‖ for more 
transparent countries amount to roughly twice the average weekly change in spreads 
measured by the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (an index that 
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follows total returns of debt instruments issued to foreign buyers by emerging market 
economies). For equities, the gain is more significant and reaches almost two and a half 
times the average weekly increase in the MSCI Emerging Market Index, which 
measures the performance of about 1,600 stocks globally (see Table 2). This is roughly 
three times more than the increase in exposure that a country would get from doubling 
its international portfolio flows. Qualitatively, this result holds not only for government 
policies, but also for the other measures of transparency mentioned above. 
Policy challenge 
Our research implies that emerging markets are not helpless when it comes to 
responding to the ups and downs of global markets. Countries that wish to benefit from 
financial globalization can reduce its unpleasant side effects by becoming more 
transparent—that is, by providing more data and in a more timely fashion, improving 
corporate disclosure standards, increasing the predictability of policies, and, more 
generally, improving governance. In other words, increasing transparency may be an 
effective instrument for countries to consider before resorting to other measures aimed 
at reducing the adverse consequences of capital flows.  
Luis Brandão-Marques is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, Gaston Gelos is a Division Chief in the IMF’s Monetary 
and Capital Markets Department, and Natalia Melgar is an Economist in the IMF’s 
Resident Representative Office in Uruguay. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall the event confirmed that there is a strong imperative to find ways to 
stimulate growth in the project and infrastructure market so that the financing potential 
of the private sector can be unleashed. Given the weight that investors put on 
transparency, the provision of high-quality information relating to default risk is likely 
to be a vital component of any solutions that are reached. 
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